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CHAPTER ll 
THE GENEVA CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL 
SHELF: SOME PROBLEM SITUATIONS 
Although it is not possible to contemplate all of the different 
problem situations which may arise in the exploitation by the coastal 
state of its continental shelf resources under the provisions of the 
Geneva Convention, a :few typical problems may be suggested. 
In analyzing these proble1ns it is well to remember that the presently 
known methods for exploiting the subsoil resources of the shelf fall 
into two groups: 
1. Exploitation from the land mass by means of tunnels, as in the 
case of coal mines, and directional drilling for oil, gas and other 
resources. 
2. Exploitation from the high seas by means of (a) fixed installa-
tions; (b) mobile installations or units; and (c) floating devices.1 
Mining tunnels from the mainland into the submarine subsoil have 
been used for more than a century. 2 This method is not likely to 
create any problems except in the case of t"\vo states :facing each 
other with a common continental shelf. :Eiere the problem ·which 
might arise is that State A could drill its tunnel beyond the con-
tinental shelf boundary line as provided for in Article 6 of the Con-
vention. 3 In such case State A would be liable in damages to co1n-
pensate State B for the resources taken, and would be guilty of violat-
ing the sovereignty of State B. 
Article 7 of the Convention suggests another problem which n1ight 
arise in the distant :future, although it is not likely to be the cause 
of any im1nediate concern in view o:f the limitations of present tech-
nology. It provides: 
"The provisions of these articles shall not prejudice the 
right o:£. the coastal State to exploit the subsoil by means of 
tunneling irrespective of the depth of water above the 
subsoil." 4 
1 U.N. Prep. Doc. No. 20, A/CONF.13/25, 7 (1958). 
2 Mouton, The Continental Shelf 290 (1952) ; Gidel, 1 Le Droit I nternaUonal 
Public de la 1J!er' 510 (1932). 
3 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55 (1958). 
4 Ibid., Art. 7. 
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It is possible, of course, that States A and B, facing each other 
across a rather broad expanse of high seas where the submarine area 
between them was below the 200 meter depth, could be seeking the same 
resources. State A could be tunnelling (or using directional drilling) 
to exploit the resources and State B could be attempting to exploit the 
same resources from permanent installations or mobile units on the 
high seas. 
If such a situation should arise it would appear possible to invoke 
the boundary line provisions of Article 6 mentioned above and arrive 
at an equitable division of the resources involved. Unfortunately 
Article 7 did not use the term "directional drilling" as \veil as the 
term "tunnelling." However, in view of the general intent of the 
Convention to place no limitations upon the coastal state in the ex-
ploitation of its submarine resources through the use of devices which 
originate on the land mass and hence do not per se interfere with 
fishing, navigation, etc., it is logical to interpret "tunnelling" broadly 
to include "directional drilling." 
One may conclude, therefore, that the problems arising out of the 
first method of exploiting continental shelf resources, namely, :from 
tunnels or other devices originating on the land mass are not likely to 
be of major concern. However, when the continental shelf is ex-
ploited from the high seas, either with fixed installations or with 
1nobile or floating devices, then a number of possible problem situa-
tions may be contemplated. 
A. PROBLEM l. USE OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF FOR 
PURPOSES OTHER THAN EXPLOITATION 
OF NATURAL RESOURCES 
Article 2 of the Convention provides: 
#"The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sov-
ereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting 
its natural resources." 5 (Emphasis added.) 
Suppose that a state wishes to use its continental shelf for building 
permanent installations for defense purposes: radar platforms, sub-
marine detection installations, \Veather stations, and even missile 
launching sites. Would such use be permitted under the provisions 
of the Convention and, if not, could they be justified under the 
inherent right of the state to take reasonable measures to provide for 
its defense~ 
Under a strict interpretation of Article 2 of the Convention, a 
coastal state is granted sovereign rights only for the purpose of ex-
5 Ibid., Art. 2. 
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ploiting the natural resources of its continental shelf. Hence it might 
be maintained that the state could not build radar platforms, weather 
stations, or other defense installations because these would not be for 
the purpose of exploiting the natural resources. 
On the other hand, it seems more logical to argue that the right to 
exploit natural resources carries with it the corollary right to use 
whatever means are reasonable. The Convention itself suggests a 
test for reasonable means : those which "must not result in any unjusti-
fiable interference with navigation, fishing, or the conservation of the 
living resources of the .... " 6 Attaching lights, radar and weather 
equipment, and other devices to oil drilling installations, or mounting 
them on separate towers, would seem to constitute reasonable means of 
protecting the installations. 
Moreover, a coastal state which builds an oil drilling platform in 
conformity \Vith the provisions of the Convention would be entitled 
to install thereon a weather station or a radar antenna as part of its 
right to take measures necessary for the protection of its installations. 7 
Certainly this is a necessary corollary to the state's exploitation of its 
continental shelf resources. It follows, therefore, that if a weather 
station, radar antenna or other devices would be permitted on an oil 
drilling platform to protect the installation, the text of the Conven-
tion would imply permission to put such devices on separate platfor1ns 
even though they might serve the dual purpose of servicing the oil 
exploitation safety zone and of augmenting the security of the coastal 
state against attack. 
It is a logical step to conclude that a coastal state could establish de-
fense installations on its continental shelf which were in no \vay con-
nected with its installations used for exploring and exploiting the 
natural resources. 
Finally, one may look to some defeated proposals at the Geneva 
Conference to conclude that a coastal state may use the continental 
shelf for the construction of defense installations quite apart from the 
exploitation of natural resources. Bulgaria introduced a proposal 
that "the coastal State shall not use the continental shelf for the pur-
pose of building military bases or any installations 1-ohich are directed 
against other states.'' 8 (Emphasis added.) Subsequently, Bulgaria 
revised the proposal by omitting the last six 'vords to remove the sug-
gestion of aggressive intent, saying, "the coastal State shall not use the 
6 Ibid., Art. 5 (1). 
7 Ibid., Art. 5 (2). 
8 U.N. Doc A/CONF.13/C. 4/L. 41 (1958). 
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continental shelf for the purpose of building military bases or installa-
tions." 9 The proposal was defeated. 
India subsequently introduced a similar proposal which also failed. 10 
Hence, it is clear that the delegates who drafted and approved the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf purposely did not deny the right of 
the coastal state to build defense installations on its continental shelf 
for the purpose of augmenting its security against attack. Ho,vever, 
it is reasonable to expect that such defense installations, like those used 
for exploiting the natural resources, would not be permitted to result 
"in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the con-
servation of the living resources of the sea. . . . " 11 
Quite apart from interpretations o:f the Convention on the Continen-
tal Shelf and inferences from defeated proposals which suggest that a 
state may build defense installations on its continental shelf, perhaps 
the most compelling reason justifying the building of radar pla.t:forms, 
weather installations and other devices on the shelf even for the sole 
purpose of increasing the coastal state's security is the inherent right 
of each state to provide for its own protection. Nothing in the Con-
vention on the Continental Shelf, or in any of the other three Geneva 
Conventions diminishes that right in the slightest. This being the case, 
one may justify such security installations not only under a/ broad in-
terpretation of the Convention, bu't also under the inherent right of 
self -defense.12 
B. PROBLEM 2.. USE OF NEUTRAL STATE'S CONTINENTAL 
SHELF SAFETY ZONE AREA AS A BASE OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS BY AN OVERSEAS 
STATE 
FACTS: State A, a coastal state, has developed an extensive cluster 
of oil drilling installations on the continental shelf some distance 
beyond her territorial sea but near a recognized sea lane.* 
In accordance with the provisions of Article 5 of the Geneva Conven-
tion on the Continental Shelf, State A has established a safety zone 
extending to a distance of 500 meters around the installations as meas-
*See Diagram. 
9 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/C. 4/L. 41/Rev.,1 (1958). 
10 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/C. 4/L. 57 (1958). 
11 Ibid., Art. 5 ( 1) . 
12 U.N. Charter, Art. 51. See Kunz, "Individual and Collective Self-defense in 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations," 41 A .. J.I.L. 872-9 (1947). 
Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 66 (1958). 
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ured from each point of their outer edge, and has notified all na-
tions of this safety zone.13 
The distance between installations varies from 400 to 1,000 meters, 
thus providing sufficient clearance for the passage of vessels through 
the waters of the safety zone. State A has put lights and foghorns 
on each of the installations to warn ships which might stray from the 
recognized sea lane. She has also equipped some of the installations 
with defensive radar antenna and sonic devices in augmentation of 
her own security. 
War breaks out between States X and Y, whereupon State A notifies 
each of the belligerents of her neutrality. 
13 
"Article 5 
"1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its natural 
resources must not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, 
fishing or the conservation of the living resources of the sea, nor result in any 
interference with fundamental oceanographic or other scientific research carried 
out with the intention of op.en publication. 
"2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 6 of this article, the coastal 
State is entitled to construct and maintain or operate on the continental shelf 
installations and other devices necessary for its exploration and the exploitation 
of its natural resources, and to establish safety zones around such installations 
and devices and to take in those zones measures necessary for their protection. 
"3. The safety zones referred to in paragraph 2 of this article may extend to a 
distance of 500 metres around the installations and other devices which have 
been erected, measured from each point of their outer edge. Ships of all national-
ities must respect these safety zones. 
"4. Such installations and devices, though under the jurisdiction of the coastal 
States, do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of 
their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial 
sea of the coastal State. 
"5. Due notice must be given of the construction of any such installations, and 
permanent means for giving warning of their presence must be maintained. 
Any installations which are abandoned or disused must be entirely removed. 
"6. Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety zones around them may 
be established where interference may be caused to the use of recognized sea 
lanes essential to international navigation. 
"7. The coastal State is obliged to undertake, in the safety zones, all appro-
priate measures for the protection of the living resources of the sea from harm-
ful agents. 
"8. The consent of the coastal State shall be obtained in respect of any research 
concerning the continental shelf and undertaken there. Nevertheless, the coastal 
State shall not normally withhold its consent if the request is submitted by a 
qualified institution with a view to purely scientific research into the physical 
or biological characteristics of the continental shelf, subject to the proviso that 
the coastal State shall have the right, if it so desires, to participate or to be 
represented in the research, and that in any event the results shall be published." 
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State X has a large submarine fleet which has been effective in sink-
ing ships of State Y which use the sea lane near State A's continental 
shelf installations. Part of State X's success is due to the fact that 
her submarines have been using State A's safety zone area around the 
installations without permission as a haven from attack and as a base 
of operations. Although these submarines have never surfaced within 
the safety zone, their periodic presence is known both to State A and 
State Y. Aside from the fact that the personnel of State A working 
on the installations have become fearful that the safety zone might 
become a battle area, the submarines have not impaired or endangered 
the production of oil. 
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Finally, State Y notifies State A that henceforth if any sub-
marines are found in the safety zone they will be subject to attack, 
even though such attack might involve the destruction of one or more 
of the installations and the loss of life among State A's personnel. 
All three countries have ratified the l-Iague Convention XIII of 
1907, concerning the rights and duties of neutral powers in naval war. 
GENERAL QUESTION: What are the rights and duties of each 
of the three states : A (neutral), X and Y (belligerents) ~ 
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS: 
1. Does the provision of Article 5 (3) of the Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf requiring that ships of all nationalities must 
respect the safety zones established by the coastal state around its 
installations mean that all of the waters within the confines of the 
zone may be closed by the coastal state to vessels of other states for all 
purposes, or only for the purpose of, and to the extent necessary for, 
the protection of the installations~ 
2. Are the waters within the safety zone territorial sea~ 
3. I£ not, are they sufficiently analogous to territorial sea to cause 
the rights and dutiP-s of a neutral state under the Hague Convention 
No. XIII of 1907 to apply to the safety zone~ 
4. Does State A have the right under the Geneva Convention on 
the Continental Shelf, or an inherent right of self-defense quite apart 
from the Convention, to exclude the submarines of State X and the 
warships of State Y, and such other ships of both belligerents as 
might result in a collision of forces in the safety zone, in order to avoid 
the imminent danger in the zone of (a) possible serious impairment 
of State A's ewclusive 14 use (i.e., exploitation of the continental shelf 
resources), and (b) possible serious impairment of the inclusive uses 
(i.e., navigation, fishing, etc.) by all states, including State A~ 
5. Assuming that State A has the right to exclude all ships of both 
belligerents because of the (a) possible serious impair1nent of State 
A's ewchtsive use ( i..e., exploitation of the continental shelf resources), 
and (b) possible serious impairment of the inclusive uses (i.e., naviga-
tion, fishing, etc.) of all states, does State A have the duty to do so? 
Q l . Does the provision of Article 5 (3) of the Geneva Conven-
t ion on the Continental Shelf requiring that ships of all nationalities 
must respect the safety zones established by the coastal state around 
its installations mean that all of the waters within the confines of the , 
14 The terms "exclusive use" and "inclusive use" are used here in the same 
sense as used by McDougal & Burke to whom an indebtedness is acknowledged. 
McDouga l & Burk, "Crisis in the Law of the Sea: Community Perspectives 
versus Na tional Egoism," 67 Y ale Law Journal539' (1958). 
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safety zone may be closed by the coastal state to vessels of other states 
for all purposes, or only for the purpose of, and to the extent neces-
sary for, the protection of the installations~ 
The above question is not easy to answer because certain provisions 
of the Convention make it possible to support opposing arguments. 
Looking to the language of the Convention one finds in Article 3 the 
express provision that "the rights of the coastal State over the con-
tinental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent 'vaters 
as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters." 15 From this 
language it follows that the waters around the installations are high 
seas from which other states ordinarily may not be excluded, despite 
the right of the coastal state to establish a safety zone and to require 
that all ships respect it. This being the case, the waters within the 
~afety zone could be used by all states for navigation, fishing, 
scientific research, and other purposes, provided that such uses do not 
endanger the installations or interfere unreasonably with the produc-
tion of oil. 
Moreover, Article 5 (7) provides that the "coastal State is obliged 
to undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate measures for the 
protection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents." 
This language implies that the 'vaters around the installations, with-
in and adjacent to the safety zone, are high seas in which all states 
1nay fish, subject to any limitations imposed by existing treaties or by 
the Geneva Convention on Fisheries/6 and hence said high seas may 
not be closed by the coastal state. 
Finally, one finds support for the argument that safety zone waters 
are high seas, which normally may not be closed by the coastal state 
to other users, by noting a defeated Netherlands proposal in Commit-
tee IV of the Geneva Conference which would have prohibited all 
ships over a certain size from entering the safety zone and would 
have made said area prohibited anchorage for all vessels. Nether-
lands proposed that: 
"A group of such installations and devices shall be con-
sidered as one unit if the distances are less than half a nauti-
cal mile. Entrance into such units is forbidden for all ships 
of more than 1,000 registered tons, except exploration and 
exploitation craft .... The area inside such units shall be a 
prohibited anchorage." 17 
By defeating this proposal, Committee IV of the Geneva Confer-
ence supported the principle that navigation through and anchorage 
15 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55 (1958). 
16 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/I.J. 54 and Add.1 (1958). 
17 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/42, 132 (1958). 
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in the safety zone area surrounding the installations is insured to 
overseas states as a matter of right, subject, of course, to the corol-
lary ewclusive right of the coastal state to exploit the continental 
shelf resources, and the inclusive rights of all users to fish, etc., within 
the safety zone. 
When the coastal state establishes a safety zone around the installa-
tions or devices on the continental shelf, the waters within the zone 
become 'vhat might be described as "protected high seas." 18 This 
term is for1nulated to designate a change in the character of the high 
seas within a particular area (i.e., within the safety zone) and for a 
limited time (i.e., until the installations are abandoned and ren1oYed 
or until the safety zone is discontinued even though the installations 
remain). 
vVherever an area of the high seas involves competing inclusive 
uses such as navigation, fishing, scientific research, cable laying, etc., 
each user has a general obligation to accommodate every other user 
in order to permit maximum possible benefits to all states. Ho-wever, 
with the development of permanent installations on the continental 
shelf, and the creation of the right under the Convention for the 
coastal state to establish safety zones around the installation, the 
general obligation of accommodation has had to become specific and 
somewhat detailed within this limited area of the high seas, assuming 
of course that the coastal state exercises its right to establish such a 
zone. 
The superjacent waters of the continental shelf are designated by 
the Convention as high seas (Art. 3), but the waters within the safety 
zone should more propertly be thought of and designated as "pro-
tected high seas," even though the Convention does not do so, because 
within the safety zone all users have more specific rights and duties 
relative to other users than in other areas of the high seas. These 
specific rights and duties are prescribed by the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf. For example, the coastal state is obligated to 
undertake in the safety zones all appropriate measures for the pro-
18 It is the establishment of the safety zone around the installations by the 
coastal state which gives to the waters within the zone the character of "pro-
tected high seas" and creates certain rights and duties in the coastal state 
which it does not have in the absence of a safety zone. It is true, of course, 
that even though a safety zone is not established, as in many instances it will 
not be since there is no duty of the coastal state to do so, the Convention pro-
vides for certain rights and duties of various users in an undefined area around 
the installations. For example, the exploitation of the natural resources must 
not result in any unjustifiable interference with navigation, fishing, etc., without 
reference to whether a safety zone has been established or not. 
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tection o£ the living resources o£ the sea £rom harmful agents.19 Also, 
ships of all nationalities must respect the safety zones/0 and the 
coastal state is entitled to take 1neasures in the zones for the protection 
of installation, devices, etc. 21 
That the special character of the high seas vvithin the safety zone 
as "protected high seas" may be temporary is indicated by the fact 
that the Convention provides that when the installations are a ban-
do ned or disused, they must be removed. 22 After the removal of the 
installations the safety zone would cease to exist and the "protected 
high seas" thereof would once again become just high seas, on which 
all users would resume their general obligations to accommodate all 
other users, except to the extent that treaties enunciated specific obli .. 
gations. Moreover, since the Convention confers upon the coastal 
state the right to establish safety zones, but does not impose the 
duty to do so, the coastal state could disestablish safety zones, even 
though the installations remained. 
Thus it is clear that within the safety zone various users are pro-
tected by certain express provisions of the Convention. The right to 
exploit a particular use within the safety zone, whether it be drilling 
for oil, navigating through the zone, fishing therein, conducting scien-
tific research, laying submarine cables or pipelines, or doing other 
things, is prescribed by protective regulations covering this specific 
area of the high seas for as long as the safety zone exists. 
Although the coastal state has the exclusive right to exploit the 
natural resources of the continental shelf, the exercise of this right is 
circumscribed in a number of ways both within the safety zone and 
outside it, even though a safety zone may not have been established. 
Moreover, as between the several inclusive users within a safety zone, 
it may be necessary at times to accord some users preferential treat-
ment over others. For example, those using the "protected high seas" 
of the zone for peaceful purposes may be entitled to preferential use 
as against belligerents under certain circumstances. 
While the Convention provides that the coastal State has the right 
to establish the safety zone and to take protective measures therein, 
this right normally would not justify the exclusion of other users from 
·the zone, unless the other users were unreasonably impeding or 
endangering either the exploitation of the continental shelf resources, 
or the other uses of the "protected high seas" within the zone. 
19 Convention on the Continental Shelf Art. 5 (7). U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 
13/L. 55 (1958). 
20 Ibid., Art. 5 ( 3) . 
21 Ibid., Art. 5 (2). 
22 Ibid., Art. 5 ( 5) . 
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On the other hand, it could be argued, although the argument is 
less compelling, that the Convention contemplates that the safety zone 
may la 'vfully be closed to navigation, fishing and other uses as long 
as the installations are being used for the exploitation of the resources 
o:f the continental shelf. The first argument in support of this 
position is based upon Article 5 ( 6) of the Convention which provides: 
"Neither the installations or devices, nor the safety zones 
around them may be established where interference may be 
caused to the use of recognized sea lanes essential to inter-
national na vigation.23 
This language. suggests that most navigation, if not all, is to take 
place in recognized sea lanes wherein continental shelf installations 
may not be located. Conversely, it may be inferred that such installa-
tions are to be located in waters which are not ordinarily to be used 
for navigation, except by the coastal state in servicing her installa-
tions, at least not so long as the installations are in use. Hence, the 
safety zone could be considered closed to navigation. 
Still another argument against permitting any navigation into or 
through the safety zone surrounding the installations is to be found 
in the preparatory document which the delegates had before them in 
drafting the general requirement that ''ships of all nationalities must 
respect these safety zones." 24 In response to a question as to the 
need for a safety zone around -oil drilling installations on the con-
tinental shelf, an oil industry spokesman said, 
"It is desirable to establish a safety zone around the installa-
tions for the exploration and exploitation of the mineral re-
sources of the continental shelf because of the possible pres-
ence of hydrocarbon vapours .... It would be desirable to pro-
hibit entrance to these zones altogether, because any vessel, or 
its personnel, who may be unaware of the hazards involved, 
might unwittingly provide a source of ignition for the hydro-
carbon vapours which could be present." 25 (Emphasis 
added) 
The statement of the oil industry spokesman emphasizes the ex-
cessive danger of permitting entrance into the zones around oil well 
installations, at least by surface vessels 'vhich might ignite the hydro-
carbon vapors. However, even assuming that this reasoning is valid , 
for surface vessels, it 'vould have no applicability in the present in-
stance unless the submarines of State X surfaced in the safety zone, 
23 U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L. 55 (1958). 
24 Ibid., Art. 5 ( 2) . 
25 U.N. Prep. Doc. No. 21, A/CON]"\ 13/26, 5 (1958). 
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\vhich they have not done thus far, or unless the surface ships of State 
Y entered the zone to destroy the submarines. Moreover, it would 
not apply where the installations were used for the extraction of 
resources which did not produce dangerous hydrocarbon vapors. 
Cone} usion with respect to Question 1 : 
'fhe more logical arguments lead to the conclusion that the waters 
\vithin the safety zone around the continental shelf installations are 
"protected high seas" which may be used concurrently by all states 
for navigation, fishing, and for other purposes, subject only to the 
limitation that such uses must not unreasonably interfere with nor 
unduly endanger the operation of the installations by the coastal state, 
and subject to the obligation of each user to accommodate every other 
user. 
Since navigation contemplates subsurface as well as surface navi-
gation, and war vessels as well as merchantment, State X's submarines 
could traverse or anchor in the safety zone, provided that in doing so 
they did not impair or endanger the production of oil by State A. 
The facts indicate that State X's submarines thus far had not impaired 
or endangered State A's oil production. Therefore, in the early stages 
of its use of the safety zone, State X would not be in violation of the 
Convention. Hence, until the ultimatum \vas received from State Y, 
indicating the possibility of imminent collision of forces in the safety 
zone, including possible damage to the installations and the personnel 
thereof, State A would not have the right to order State X's sub-
Inarines to cease using the safety zone for a haven and a base of naval 
operations against State Y. Of course, it could be argued that State 
Y has a right to attack the submarines of State X within the safety 
zone on sight without an ultimatum to State A, since the waters of said 
zone are a part of the high seas. However, the waters are of a special 
kind which we have described as "protected high seas." Although 
the coastal state does not have as extensive rights vis-a vis belligerents 
in these "protected high seas" of the safety zone as she has in the 
neutral waters of her own territorial sea, she does have greater rights 
than she has on the high seas. As will be seen later, these rights of 
the coastal state include the right to take "protective measures" in 
order to safeguard her installations. In extreme cases these protec-
tive measures could result in an exclusion of the submarines of State 
X. Hence, it is debatable \vhether State Y \vould have the right to 
attack the submarines of State X in the "protected high seas" of the 
safety zone without first notifying State A of her intention to do so. 
Such notification would permit State A to take whatever protective 
measures were necessary to protect her installations, including the 
exclusion of State X's submarines from the safety zone waters. 
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Q 2. Are the waters within the safety zone a territorial sea~ 
The Convention provides an unequivocal answer to this question. 
Article 5 ( 4) says, 
"Such installations and devices, though under the juris-
diction of the coastal State, do not possess the status of 
islands. They have no territorial sea of their o1vn, and 
their presence does not affect the delimitation of the 
territorial sea of the coastal State." 26 
It is clear, therfore, that the man-made installations are not like 
natural islands which do have a territorial sea of their own. Hence 
the rights and duties of a neutral state 1vith respect to its territorial 
sea 'vould not apply. 
Q 3. If the waters within the safety zone are not territorial seas, 
are they sufficiently analogous to territorial sea to cause the rights 
and duties of a neutral state under the Hague Convention No. XIII 
of 1907 to apply? 
In order to answer this question it may be helpful to look at some of 
the articles of the Hague Convention No. XIII of 1907 to which all 
three states are parties.27 
"Article I. Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign 
rights of neutral Powers and to abstain, in neutral territory 
or neutral waters, from all acts which would constitute, on 
the part of the neutral Powers, which knowingly permitted 
them, a non-fulfillment of their neutrality. 
"* * * 
"Article V. Belligerents are forbidden to use neutral ports 
and waters as a base of naval operations against their adver-
saries, and in particular to erect wireless telegraph stations 
or any apparatus for the purpose of communicating with 
belligerent forces on land or sea. 
"Article VI. The supply, in any manner, directly or in-
directly, by a neutral Power to a belligerent Power, of 
vessels of war, stores, or war material of any kind ·whatever, 
is forbidden. 
"* * * 
"Article XIII. If a Power which has been informed of 
the outbreak of hostilities learns that a belligerent ship of 
26 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 55 (1958). 
27 For full text see U.S. Naval War College International Law Situation8 1908 
213-222 (1909) : 36 Stat. 2415: U.S.T.S. 545: II Malloy's Treatie8. 2352 (1910). 
war is in one of its ports or roadsteads, or in its territorial 
waters it must notify the said ship to depart within twenty-
four hours or within the time prescribed by the local 
regulations." 
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One of the purposes of a declaration of neutrality is to keep bellig-
erents and their destructive forces from harming persons or property 
of the neutral state located within the territory or aboard her ships. 
Although continental shelf installations might be considered akin to 
ships, it seems more appropriate to classify them as man-made islands 
and hence a part of the State's territory. As such they are entitled 
to be free from involvement in hostilities unless they are being used to 
assist one of the belligerents. 
Article I of the Hague Convention above indicates that belligerents 
are bound "to respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers" and are 
"forbidden to use neutral ports and waters as a base of naval opera-
tions against their adversaries." It might be argued that since the 
continental shelf installations themselves are subject to the sovereign 
rights of State A, the waters adjacent to those installations within 
the safety zone, while not territorial waters as such, nevertheless 
could be considered "neutral waters" from which State A could ex-
clude the submarines of State X in order to keep the fighting a way 
from the installations (i.e., a way from the territory of State A). 
However, in the interest of providing for the freedom of the high 
seas and their maximum use by all states, including belligerents, the 
sounder view is that the waters around the continental shelf installa-
tions are not neutral waters by analogy to territorial waters which 
the Convention specifically says they are not, but are "protected high 
seas." This being so, State X. is perfectly free to traverse or anchor 
in State A's safety zone, subject to the specific obligations imposed 
by the Convention in what we have designated "protected high seas." 
Since the waters around the installations are not "neutral waters" 
State A has neither rights nor duties as a neutral under the Hague 
Convention No. XIII of 1907 with respect to those waters. More-
over, the mere fact that the presence of a cluster of State A's conti-
nental shelf installations in the high seas incidentally affords some 
assistance to one of the belligerents does not negate State A's 
impartiality as a neutral. 
Of course, if State A permitted State X's submarines to erect wire-
less telegraph stations or any apparatus on the installations them-
selves for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces, which 
action is prohibited under Article V of the Hague Convention No. 
XIII of 1907, or permitted State X to refuel the submarines from 
I 
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the installations, also prohibited by the Convention,28 such action 
would constitute a violation of State A's neutrality since the installa-
tion is part of State A's territory over which she has "sovereign rights" 
and "exclusive use" under the provisions of the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf.29 In such case, State A would have a duty to 
force State X to discontinue using the installations or she would 
violate her neutral status.30 
Q 4. Does State A have the right under the Geneva Convention 
on the Continental Shelf, or an inherent right of self-defense quite 
apart from the Convention, to exclude the submarines of State X and 
the warships of State Y (and such other ships of both belligerents 
as might result in a collision of forces in the safety zone) in order 
to avoid the imminent danger in the zone of (a) possible serious im-
pairment of State A's exclusive use (i.e., exploitation of the con-
tinental shelf resources), and (b) possible serious impairment of the 
inclusive uses (i.e., navigation, fishing, etc.) by all states, including 
State A. 
The answer to the first part of this question depends upon the inter-
pretation o£ the language of the Convention which gives the coastal 
state the right "to establish safety zones around such installations and 
devices an9. to take in those zones measures necessary for their protec-
tion," 31 and the right to demand that "ships of all nationalities must 
respect these safety zones." 32 
At the outset it is clear that this Convention and the other three 
drafted at Geneva in 1958 contemplated peacetime uses of the con-
tinental shelf, the high seas, territorial waters and contiguous zones. 
Although a neutral state's rights on the high seas are restricted in 
certain respects during a war (e.g., a belligerent has the right of visit 
and search, blockade and, under certain circumstances, the right of 
capture and condemnation of neutral ships) such restrictions do not 
apply to a state's continental shelf installations (i.e., its territory). 
Hence, it may be argued that when the Convention provides that 
"ships of all nationalities must respect these safety zones," this duty 
to the coastal state applies whether the states of the world are at peace 
28 Art. VI of the Hague Convention No. XIII of 1930 provides: 
"The supply, in any manner, directly or indirectly, by a neutral Power to 
a belligerent Power, of vessels of war, stores, or war material of any kind 
whatever, is forbidden." 
29 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/L. 55, Art. 2 (1), (2), (1958). 
30 Of course, the mere violation by State A of her neutral status would not 
cause the neutrality to end. II Oppe.nheim,~Lauterpacht 752 (7th Ed., 1952). On 
the neutral's duty of impartiality see Tucker, U.S.. Naval War College, Inter-
national Law Studies, 1955, 202 (1957). 
31 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/J_.i. 55, Art. 5(2) (1958). 
32 Ibid., Art. 5 ( 3) . 
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or some of them are at war. The "respect" required of maritime 
states is that which is reasonably necessary to prevent damage to the 
personnel and installations within the safety zone and to prevent im-
pairment of the use of these "protected high seas" by all states for 
fishing, navigation, and other uses. 
It might be argued that State A would be entitled to decree that 
all warships o£ States X and Y could not traverse, anchor in or 
otherwise use the safety zone from the inception of and during the 
belligerency because of the possible danger to the installations and 
their personnel resulting from any use by the belligerents. To sup-
port such an argument would be to grant the coastal state the same 
rights against belligerent warships in the "protected high seas" of 
the safety zone as the coastal state has in its terri to rial sea from which 
it may exclude belligerent warships entirely.33 Such an extensive 
grant of rights to the coastal state would go too far inasmuch as the 
"protected high seas" of the safety zone are not the equivalent o£ 
territorial seas. 
The protective measures which the coastal state may take in the 
safety zone under the Convention are only those \vhich are necessary. 
Although it is not possible to determine at any given tin1e what Ineas-
ures will be necessary in the future, as a broad general principle 
"necessary measures" would not include total exclusion of belligerent 
warships :from the safety zone unless and until there is a clear indi-
cation of imminent danger to the various uses within the zone. 
In the present case when State Y notified State A of intended use 
of force against the submarines of State X in the safety zone, if the 
submarines \vere not excluded from the zone, the danger of immediate 
and serious impairment of all uses, both exclusive and inclusive, 
within the safety zone became readily apparent. Hence, at this point 
State A would be entitled to take action with respect to the belliger-
ents which she normally would not be entitled to take in the absence 
of such imminent danger. Upon receipt of State Y's ultimatum, State 
A then would have the right under the Convention to exclude the -
submarines of State X and the warships of State Y, and such other 
ships of both belligerents as might result in a collision of forces in 
the safety zone, notwithstanding the :fact that the waters in the zone 
are essentially high seas. The fact that these high seas have become 
"protected high seas" gives the coastal state this right of exclusion. 
It might be argued that the mere presence of State X's submarines 
in State A's safety zone would constitute an imminent danger to the 
continental shelf installations, and that the coastal state \vould there-
fore be entitled to exclude all belligerent ships from the safety zone 
33 Tucker, U.S. Naval War College, International Law Stud ies, 195.5 (1957). 
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at the outbreak of war. However, it seems more logical to conclude 
that the mere presence of the submarines in the safety zone would not 
constitute an imminent danger until the other belligerent (State Y) 
gave some indication by word or act of an intention to attack the 
submarines in the safety zone \Vaters. While State Y was under no 
duty to announce her intention to attack the submarines within the 
safety zone, having done so it then became certain that the installa-
tions and other peaceful uses of the safety zone were henceforth in 
imminent danger so long as the submarines remained in the safety 
zone. 
Despite the paramount goal in the world community of maintain-
ing the greatest possible degree of freedom of the high seas for naVl-
gation, fishing, scientific investigation, and other uses by all states, 
and despite a preference for inclusive uses rather than exclusive uses, 
it seems logical to interpret the provisions of the Convention giving 
the coastal state the right to take protective measures within the safety 
zone as including, under unusual circumstances such as those present 
here, the right to ex·clude belligerent ships from the zone. As a corol-
lary, State X would be required to "respect the safety zone" by sub-
mitting to State A's decree to keep her submarines, and such other 
ships as might cause a collision of forces in the zone, out o:f the zone.34 
Quite apart from the Convention it seems reasonable that State A 
\Vould also ha.ve the right to exclude the submarines of State X and the 
\Va.rships of State Y, and such other ships of both belligerents as 
1night result in a collision of forces in the safety zone, under her in-
herent right of self-defense, which includes the right to protect her 
citizens and property (i.e., personnel and installations) from damage 
by belligerents. The inherent right of self -defense would per1nit the 
use of whatever force is necessary against both belligerents in the area 
of the installations. 
Q 5. Assuming that State A has the right to exclude all ships 
of both belligerents because of the (a) possible serious impairment of 
State A's exclusive use (i.e., exploitation of the continental shelf re-
sources), and (b) possible serious impairment of the inclusive uses 
(i.e., navigation, fishing, etc.) of all states, does State A have the 
duty to do so ? 
We have already seen in the discussion of Question No. 3 that since 
the waters around the installations are not "neutral waters" State A 
34 As a practical matter, if State X found that the use of State A's safety zone 
was of material benefit to her submarines, the chances are that she would vio-
late whatever provisions of the Continental Shelf Convention were necessary 
in order to maintain this advantage over State Y. 
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has neither rights nor duties as a neutral state under the Hague Con-
vention No. XIII of 1907 with respect to those waters. 
Now, however, the question is whether the right of the coastal state 
to exclude belligerent ships from the safety zone, when those ships 
appear on the verge of engaging in battle in the zone to the possible 
impairment of the exclusive and inclusive uses therein, also carries 
with it a duty to exclude when the waters are "protected high seas" 
and not territorial seas. It will be remembered that in the case of 
territorial waters the neutral state has a duty to notify a belligerent 
ship to depart from said waters within twenty-four hours or within 
the time prescribed by the local regulations.35 
Although the Convention on the Continental Shelf does not con-
tain an article which expressly imposes a duty on the coastal state to 
exclude belligerents (or any state) from the safety zone, such a duty, 
as well as other duties, are clearly i1nplied from certain provisions in 
the Convention. 
With respect to the implied duties of the coastal state, other than 
the duty to exclude belligerents under certain circumstances, it is clear 
that in exercising its right to establish safety zones around the instal-
lations and to take necessary protective measures within such zones, 
the coastal state has t\vo implied duties: (1) the duty to see that the 
protective measures are reasonable; and (2) the duty to see that they 
are uniform and non-discriminatory. That is, the coastal state could 
not apply certain measures and regulations to the ships of one country 
and not apply them to the ships of another country, although the 
coastal state could exclude the ships of two belligerents frorn the safe-
ty zone because of the imminent danger to the installations, v-vhile per-
Initting the ships of non-belligerents to continue to navigate through 
the safety zone, fish therein, etc. 
It .. follows, therefore, that if the ships of one belligerent are ex-
cluded, the ships of the other belligerent \vill also have to be excluded, 
not only for State A to fulfill its implied duty under the Convention 
to take protective measures in the safety zone \V hich are non -discrimi-
natory against similar classes of states (in this case, belligerents), but 
also under its general duty as a neutral to maintain an attitude o:f in1-
partiality by refraining from giving such assistance and succor to one 
of the belligerents as would be detrimental to the other. '36 
Returning to the main question of whether State A has a duty to 
exclude the warships of the two belligerents from the safety zone be-
cause of the imminent danger to all other users within the zone, it may 
be helpful to consider the two major groups or interests of the total 
35 Seep. 76, Art. XIII. 
aa II Oppenheirrt-Lauterpacht, op. cU., footnote 30 (at G54, 675) .' 
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situation to whom State A owes duties: (a) the belligerent interests 
and (b) the \Vorld com1nunity interests.37 
In a situation involving a neutral and belligerents, attention is 
usually focused principally upon the duty of the neutral state toward 
the belligerents. Without denying the importance of this duty, one 
may venture to suggest that in the continental shelf safety zone, which 
is unique in its creation of "protected high seas," involving a number 
of specific right-duty relationships between the various users, the 
coastal state has additional duties, beyond those owed to the belliger-
ents, which are of even greater importance. These are the duties 
owed to the world community interests. 
With reference to the coastal state's duties to the world community 
interests, it is necessary to remember that the continenal shelf concept, 
as well as the Convention on the Continental Shelf, accords sovereign 
rights to the coastal state to explore and exploit the natural resources 
of the shelf. Concomitantly, safeguards and protections are written 
into the Convention to· insure, among other things, that in the exercise 
of these sovereign rights the coastal state will not unjustifiably inter-
fere \vith navigation, fishing and other inclusive uses of the high seas 
of the area and particularly in the "protected high seas" of the safety 
zone. 
Moreover, as indicated previously the coastal state is obliged to 
undertake, in the safety zones, all appropriate measures for the pro-
tection of the living resources of the sea from harmful agents. This 
provision should be interpreted broadly to mean appropriate measures 
with respect to its own exploitation of the continental shelf resources 
and with respect to all other users within the safety zone. 
Hence, in the exercise of its exclusive right to exploit the continental 
shelf resources the coastal state assumes a clearly-implied duty 
within the safety zone, and with respect to it, vis-a-vis the world 
community interests which are entitled as a matter of right to use 
these "protected high seas" within the zone, namely, the duty to oper-
ate her installations and to control the safety zone through necessary 
37 "World community interests" is used to denote the various interests of all 
inclusive users and all benejiciari.es of the use of the "protected high seas" within 
the safety zone. Inclusive users would include both actual and potential users. 
Beneficiaries of the use of the "protected high seas" within the safety zone would 
include all states, maritime as well as land-locked, some of whom would be direct , 
beneficiaries and others indirect. vVithin limits, the situation might be com-
pared with a third-party beneficiary contract under which the coastal state as 
the obligor promises the other signatory states to the Convention to undertake 
necessary measures in the safety zone to protect the world community interests 
in return for world community acquiescence to the coastal state's sovereign 
rights to exploit the continental shelf resources, including the right to estab-
lish the safety zone around its installations and to take protective n1easures in 
said zone for its own benefit. 
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protective measures in such manner as to provide a minimuin of 
interference to and a maximum utilization by all users. 
Of course, all users includes belligerents as well as non-belligerents. 
Normally, belligerents 'vill have the right to use the "protected high 
seas" of the safety zone and the coastal state will have the corollary 
duty to permit such use. However, when belligerents indicate that 
their continued use of the safety zone is likely to destroy or seriously 
hamper the various uses of the zone by peaceful states, the coastal 
state must fulfill its larger duty to the world community interests by 
exercising its right to exclude the belligerents. 
Only the coastal state can act for the world community interests 
in this situation to insure a minimum of interference to and a maxi-
mum utilization by the non-belligerent users because only the coastal 
state has the right to establish and control a safety zone around its 
installations. Since this right is accorded by the world community 
interests to the coastal state, in accepting the right the coastal state 
assumes an implied duty to exercise the right whenever failure to do 
so could endanger or impede the normal rights of all non-belligerent 
users in the zone. 
Hence, it follows that since State A alone can take such action as 
is necessary, and has the implied duty to do so in order that the 
"protected high seas" of the safety zone will be available for the 
1naximum number of inclusive uses which the states of the world may 
wish to pursue in said zone, State A has a duty to the world com-
nlunity interests to exclude the warships of States X and Y. By act-
ing uniformly against both of these belligerents, State A will fulfill 
its duty of maintaining impartiality as well as fulfilling its duty to 
the larger, more important group of non-belligerent users of the 
safety zone. 
~lhile the exercise by State A of its duty to exclude the two bellig-
erent states from the safety zone will deprive them of access to these 
"protected high seas" it is readily apparent that the benefits derived 
from the fulfillment of State A's duty to the world community inter-
ests in insuring to all non-belligerents access to the waters of the zone 
for both exclusive and inclusive uses far transcends any disadvan-
tages which may befall one or both of the belligerents as a result of 
their own actions. 
Thus it may be concluded that while the coastal state normally 
'vould not have the duty nor, as we have seen above, the right to deny 
the use of the "protected high seas" of the safety zone to any state, 
'vhether belligerent or non-belligerent, 'vhen the belligerency reaches 
the stage of an imminent danger to and possible serious impairment 
of all other uses within the zone, the coastal state 'has the duty (as 
well as the right) to exclude the belligerents from the safety zone. 
